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Abstract
Online Social Networks (OSNs) are a unique construct
that is shaped by the advancement and availability of In-
ternet technologies. A large portion of internet users make
use of OSN services to share and celebrate their personal
lives with friends and family. A substantial proportion of
these shared experiences revolve around privacy-sensitive
information. The OSN services handling privacy-sensitive
information deploy state-of-the-art security and privacy-
preserving mechanisms. However, these protections are,
to a great extent, not consumer-centric: this is the main
focus of this study. In this paper, we define the notion of
Consumer-Centric Protection (CCP) for OSNs. In this pro-
posal, the individual user controls how her data can be ac-
cessed by her contacts (e.g. friends and family members)
and others, thus giving control of user data back to the
rightful owner — the user. This work is still in progress
and in this paper we present our preliminary results.
1 Introduction
In our societies, social structures define sets of social en-
tities and their roles/responsibilities. Such formations are so
fundamental to human societies that with the advent of any
technological revolution in communication, it is inevitably
translated into new means of communication. Examples in-
clude pen-pals using letters, telephones and internet chat.
The advent of the internet also introduced the concept of
the cyber world and the constructs of the real world were
then translated and in some cases reinterpreted. Among
these structures were social networks that were translated
into social networking sites. There are a number of so-
cial networking sites including Facebook, Google+, Twitter,
Pinterest and LinkedIn, to name just a few. A large number
of online users engage in one way or another with these
social network sites, which are also called “Online Social
Networks (OSNs)”.
OSNs project themselves as human-centric services that
facilitate the sharing and exchanging of life experiences. In
most OSNs (e.g. Facebook, Google+) the user data resides
on the network and providers use it to target their services
to individual users [11]. In certain situations such sharing
of information might be detrimental to the users’ privacy
and security [15, 22]. The openness and accessibility of the
information on OSNs has created some unintended conse-
quences, including employers or potential employers eval-
uating a job applicant’s OSN profile. Furthermore, facial
recognition technologies can be used to match an individ-
ual with his/her OSN profile [1, 29]. To provide a secure
and privacy-preserving service, certain OSNs have updated
their privacy policies. These steps are commendable; how-
ever, the security and privacy of the data is still placed in
the hands of the consumers. If a user does not configure
her privacy setting properly, she may end up sharing more
than intended while maintaining a false sense of security.
It is correct that applying default settings with strong pri-
vacy requirements is one potential solution; however, in our
opinion a consumer-centric mechanism would empower the
user more.
In this paper, we focus on a consumer-centric privacy
mechanism that provides a seamless and least-interaction-
based framework. The aim is to build a framework that does
not require consumers to change their normal behaviour in
terms of how they use the relevant OSN, and does not re-
quire any additional configuration/tasks to be performed by
the consumer. As a case study, we base our development on
Facebook: the rationale for choosing it was its top position
in terms of number of total users and daily visits.
The proposed consumer-centric protection mechanism is
based on state-of-the-art cryptographic mechanisms that se-
cure the user’s data before uploading it to the appropriate
OSN. To do so, we have proposed an additional layer be-
tween the web browser at the user’s end and OSN interface
(website). This additional layer takes care of all security-
and privacy-related tasks in a seamless manner. Only the
authorised entity, the data owner1 can decrypt it. The en-
1Data Owner: In this paper, the data owner is referred to as the user or
entity who uploads the data on an OSN.
1
cryption and decryption process is completely hidden from
the user and she does not even realise that such an opera-
tion is taking place, thus meeting our seamless integration
requirement.
The key contributions of the paper include but are not
limited to: 1) Giving control of data to users, not to any
centralised authority (i.e. OSN operator), 2) A seamless
framework that does not require users to change their be-
haviour to use their preferred OSN, 3) A consumer-oriented
privacy framework that encrypts all user activities like send-
ing text messages, status updates, and uploading images,
4) A secure key sharing mechanism to enable only autho-
rised users to view the information (i.e. messages and im-
ages).
1.1 Structure of the Paper
In section 2, we briefly discuss OSNs and associated se-
curity and privacy issues. This section also looks at the
existing work in the field of OSN data privacy and how it
compares to the proposed framework in this paper. Section
3 provides a rationale for the consumer-oriented privacy-
preserving framework proposed in this paper, along with
the requirements for the proposed framework and a generic
architecture. In section 4, we describe the implementation
of our framework to provide consumer-oriented privacy. Fi-
nally in section 5 we conclude the paper and provide future
research directions.
2 Online Social Networks
In this section, we briefly introduce OSNs and discuss
the related security and privacy issues. The section con-
cludes with the discussion of existing solutions that provide
data control in OSNs.
2.1 Brief Introduction
The phenomenon known as OSNs began with the first
well-known site called SixDegrees.com [21], which
implied the potential to connect any two users in the world.
The upsurge in OSNs began in 2003 [21] when sites like
LinkedIn, Facebook, YouTube and Twitter offered their ser-
vices to online consumers. The advent of OSN sites has had
a profound effect on both business and popular culture [8].
The main objective of the OSNs was to foster closer con-
nections and collaborations between individuals who are ei-
ther in a social network in the real world or who are part of
an online community. This objective brought a unique set of
risks and challenges; nevertheless, consumers have flocked
to these services in large numbers and usage is still growing
at a phenomenal rate [18]. A pivotal role in this proliferation
is played by the accessibility and ease with which a user can
share his or her information and gain a sense of relationship
and intimacy with friends and family on an OSN [12].
A huge amount of personal information is being shared
by OSN users and the OSN operators can use this infor-
mation to target their customers or shape their services ac-
cording to customers’ requirements [14]. With the advent
of smartphones, a new dimension to OSNs was created that
targets the more tech-savvy customers. There is a multitude
of smartphone applications, provided by traditional OSNs
like Facebook and Twitter, along with smartphone-based
OSN providers like Snapchat and WeChat. In this paper,
we will focus only on the traditional OSNs; however, the
proposed framework in its generic architecture could also
be deployed as part of the smartphone-based OSNs.
User-generated data is crucial for both the user and re-
spective OSN business models. However, the architecture
and roles around this user data are vague. Both the user
and the OSN can simultaneously assume the role of data
controller (owner) and data processor [11]. The architec-
ture and associated services of an OSN are provisioned and
maintained by the OSN operator, which can then qualify
as a data controller for the user’s data (account and usage
data) after the user’s consent [28]. The OSN operator can
use this information for commercial benefits. In contrast,
the user can qualify as the data controller for the personal
data which (s)he publishes on the OSN, such as pictures,
videos and messages. For such data, the OSN should be
merely the data processor, which stores and publishes the
user data.
However, the oversimplified explanation of how data is
managed by an OSN as presented above might not be cor-
rect in many situations. There are a number of OSNs and
their respective privacy policies declare that the operator has
the right to use the user’s (uploaded) data for their own com-
mercial purposes [11]. The wide range of services that fa-
cilitate real-time communication and exchange of data (im-
ages, videos, and messages, etc.), and the security and pri-
vacy concerns around such data have emerged as a critical
issue [24]. Such concerns are discussed at various levels in-
cluding by industry, academia and even governments [14].
We will discuss these concerns succinctly and examine the
existing proposals for potential solutions to such concerns.
2.2 Security and Privacy Issues
The security and privacy concerns regarding OSNs stem
from the lack of a strong track record for protecting users’
privacy [17]. If a user makes a misconfiguration or the OSN
does not provide a robust privacy management facility, it
is difficult to protect a user’s data from being copied and
used for nefarious purposes [7]. The privacy risks associ-
ated with user data on the OSN include but are not limited
to:
1) Loss of control of data (storage, access, and dissem-
ination) 2) No control of how such data is used by third
parties 3) Potential for identity theft
In addition to the above list, there are other concerns
about the privacy of the data as highlighted by social phish-
ing. In social phishing, a malicious user can learn about a
user through his or her OSN profiles/information and then
try to use this information to again access to or advantage
from the user’s friends, family or colleagues. The personal
information presented online can also be used by online
crooks, stalkers and bullies [2]. There are also instances
in which information available on OSNs used to spy on cit-
izens or foreigners [16].
Disclosing information on OSNs cannot be curbed: it
is difficult to convince users to stop using OSNs or limit
the information that they share. A large portion of OSN
users do understand the privacy risks but still use the sites
either because of lack of strong privacy protection tools or
the idea that such information cannot be used in any damag-
ing way [9]. An important point to note is that information
shared over an OSN is more or less permanent and making
it disappear or removing it is potentially a difficult proposi-
tion [19]. Users will keep on sharing information and there
will be the potential for breaches by different actors in the
OSN ecosystem.
There is a misconception that most OSN users are not
interested in data privacy [13]. In this paper, the notion of
privacy is defined as control over the access, flow and usage
of user data uploaded on OSNs. The user who is upload-
ing the data should be helped to exercise his/her rights over
his/her data. This is the main objective of this paper and the
proposed framework. Furthermore, in the context of this
paper we assume all three entities (Service Providers, Other
Users, and Third-Party Applications) to be less than trust-
worthy.
3 Consumer-Centric Protection for Online
Social Networks
In this section we discuss the rationale behind our pro-
posal, along with the design challenges faced. Finally, the
section ends with a succinct description of the proposed
framework and why we selected Facebook for our PoC.
3.1 Rationale for Consumer-Centric Protection
A large number of online users have opted in to various
OSNs and most of these OSNs are based on a centralised
architecture. Therefore, our choice of target OSN type was
based on deployment and consumer population.
In centralised OSNs, proposing a mechanism that re-
quires modifications to the deployed architecture is attrac-
tive and can be argued to provide a more robust solution.
However, in most cases, achieving this in real terms is close
to impossible. Therefore, we chose to provide an OSN-
independent solution. This even included the option of cre-
ating an application for the OSN provider.
The rationale behind a consumer-oriented solution is to
empower the user, the main driving force of any business
and especially of OSNs. Users have the most at stake in
the OSN ecosystem, as it’s their data and in certain situa-
tions leakage of it would be detrimental to their privacy and
possibly even their physical security. This provides a strong
reason to design a solution that is aimed at the users but at
the same time does not require them to change their activ-
ity patterns. Modifying how a user performs mundane tasks
usually either ends up being ignored or else the user just
opts out of it: an example of this is the secure email and
(smartphone) online messaging services [3].
Furthermore, when designing consumer-oriented solu-
tions, the proposal should require minimal interaction on
the user’s part and accomplish most of the security- and
privacy-related operations seamlessly in the background
[4]. Therefore, the proposal not only has to provide a robust,
scalable, secure and privacy-preserving architecture but it
also has to be a lightweight mechanism that performs most
of the tasks with minimal user interaction.
3.2 Requirements for Consumer-Centric Protec-
tion
In this section we propose the fundamental requirements
for the proposed framework. These requirements are by no
means an exhaustive list, but should be taken as the ini-
tial set of requirements at the current stage of the work on
consumer-oriented protection.
3.2.1 User’s Personal Space Privacy
The user’s personal space on the OSN refers to their pro-
file, messages (e.g. status updates) and images. This re-
quirement demands that information present on the personal
space of the user should only be accessible2 to the users and
to entities as defined by the users.
3.2.2 User’s Communication Privacy
Individual users might communicate with their contacts us-
ing OSN services. All such communications should be pro-
tected and only the intended recipients should be able to
access the information.
2Accessibility in this context means access to the understandable
(plaintext) information and not the encrypted information.
3.2.3 Privilege to Reveal and Control
Finally, users should have total control over their informa-
tion. This total control extends to not only include users’
friends and family but also OSN providers.
The generic architecture of our proposal is discussed
in the next section, followed by the rationale for why we
choose Facebook to be the host OSN for our PoC.
3.3 Proposed Architecture for Consumer-Centric
Protection
The proposal is required to be a seamless and least-
interaction solution. For this reason we are proposing a
thin and lightweight layer called “Consumer-Oriented Pro-
tection (COP)” to be added to the traditional model of the
OSN. Figure 1 shows a reference architecture for an OSN
with the proposed COP layer.
Hardware Infrastructure
Operating System
Data Storage Layer
Content Management Layer
Application Layer
User Interface
Consumer-Oriented Protection
Figure 1. Reference Architecture of an OSN
with Proposed COP Layer
The basic components of an OSN are constructed over
the hardware infrastructure and the underlying operating
system. The data storage layer deals with different stor-
age technologies to support a reliant and robust architecture.
The content management layer is where most of the OSN
management services are deployed and this layer deals with
the user/data management, access control and content ag-
gregation. On top of this layer is the application layer that
provides user-oriented services like searches, music, videos
and photo rendering. The user interface is the layer that a
user directly interacts with and it is in most cases the web-
site of the OSN. Our proposed layer sits on the top of the
user interface without requiring any change to it. It should
be implemented as a transparent layer and from the users’
point of view they should be directly interacting with the
user interface. However, before the user interface transfers
information to the application layer the COP will enforce
the user’s protection policies.
From an operational point of view, the user interface is
presented to the user via a web browser. Therefore, the most
suitable place for our proposal to be implemented is at the
web browser. Therefore, the proposed COP is implemented
as an add-on to the web browser that observes the user’s
activities and for data where a privacy policy has to be en-
forced, it interrupts these data transfers and treats the data
accordingly.
There are three main protection operations that the COP
preforms: encrypting and decrypting data and key ex-
change. In addition, from an operational point of view the
COP also retrieves the user’s contacts and any groupings
defined on the OSN (e.g. user groups on Facebook). As a
design ideology we opted for not storing user’s contacts to
any server, including the COP’s server3.
Facebook is the top OSN provider by far in the market.
The total number of active users and unique visitors to Face-
book makes it the major market leader [18]. For this reason
we chose Facebook for our initial PoC. Although in this pa-
per we are only discussing the Facebook implementation, in
future we would like to extend it to other major OSNs.
4 Consumer-Centric Protection for Face-
book
In this section we very briefly discuss the current state of
the PoC for the COP proposal based on Facebook.
4.1 Initial Implementation
As our initial PoC implementation, we developed an
add-on for the Firefox browser. This add-on represents
the COP layer depicted in Figure 1. The browser add-on
interrupts status update, message sent and image upload
events. After intercepting these events, the add-on then en-
crypts these data values accordingly. For encryption we
are using Advance Encryption Standard (AES) in Cipher-
Feedback Mode (CFM) and Galois/Counter Model (GCM).
For key share mechanism, we have currently implemented
ECC based encryption/decryption mechanism. The AES
keys used to encrypted data is embedded with the data en-
crypted with the public key of the intended recepient. Sim-
ilarly, when a user browses a Facebook page and there are
some items that are encrypted, the add-on automatically de-
tects them. It then decrypts them and displays them to the
user. In all this process of encryption and decryption the
user is not actively involved. The user only has to enable
the encryption of different data types (e.g. status update,
messages and images).
Figure 2 shows the before and after situation when a user
updates his or her status on Facebook. When the user clicks
the “Post” button or presses “Enter,” the add-on captures the
data (in this case the “Testing Status”) and encrypts it. The
3In its current stage of the PoC, the COP proposal is based on a com-
pletely decentralised architecture. However, further experiments and eval-
uation are required to decide which architecture would be most suitable for
the COP proposal.
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Figure 2. Status update message before and
after encryption
encrypted value is displayed to the user. A point to note
is that on the next page refresh or after a certain amount
of time, the encrypted status will be displayed to user as
plaintext as shown in Figure 3.
Figure 3 also shows that when a user comments on a
status update, message or an image, the add-on interrupts
the data and encrypts it.
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Figure 3. Comments before and after encryp-
tion
As with previous operations, in Figure 4 a user is upload-
ing images to Facebook. The add-on interrupts the upload-
ing processing and encrypts the image before transferring it
to the OSN server.
All of the operations discussed in this section are per-
formed by the add-on in a seamless manner. We do not
modify the OSN interface. The only implementation is done
as part of the browser add-on.
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Figure 4. Images before and after encryption
4.2 Challenges Ahead
In the current iteration, we have implemented the en-
cryption, decryption and basic key share. The basic key
share is peer-to-peer in which the key is only shared in
one-to-one relationships. What this means is that a user
can communicate securely with only one user at a time.
The key share is achieved by embedding the key sharing
information in the communicated data (messages and im-
ages). However, at present we are working on key shar-
ing in one-to-many relationships. There are multiple ways
we can achieve this that include using a group key, via a
centralised server (i.e. potentially a key distribution server:
COP Server) or a decentralised architecture. We have to
perform extensive evaluation before selecting a suitable so-
lution. Furthermore, we are trying to optimise the add-on in
a manner that imposes minimal performance penalties. In
future work, we would also like to evaluate our proposal for
security and robustness. Finally, we would like to port the
add-on to other browsers with support for additional OSNs.
5 Conclusion
The privacy of user data is of paramount importance and
it has received, to some extent, the necessary attention from
academics, the public, industries and governments. How-
ever, the missing link in all the efforts is that most of the
solutions are built from an architecture point of view that is
not centred on the consumer, who is, ironically, the entity
whose data all of the solutions are trying to protect. A po-
tential reason for this might be that users are considered to
be either the weakest link or not technically sound enough
to carry out complex security-related tasks. However, we
consider that security does not always have to require an ac-
tive interaction with the users. It can be built as a seamless,
lightweight and least-interaction mechanism. Therefore, to
provide a consumer-oriented protection for users on OSNs,
we have proposed a framework in this paper. The COP
framework is implemented as a web browser add-on that in-
tercepts users’ actions and if required, enforces the privacy
policy. The enforcement of the privacy policy is completed
seamlessly and does not require the user’s input. The pro-
posed framework emphasises that user behaviour and OSN
interfaces should not be required to fit the operations of the
COP. In fact, it should be the other way around, where the
COP should be implemented in a way that supports user be-
haviour and the OSN interface. The proposal in this paper
is research in progress and we are highly confident that this
proposal can be polished and refined to provide an effective
and robust data privacy system for OSN users.
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